Difference between revisions of "Incident Report: 20191104"

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'''This is still under construction because this literally just happened. When finished, I'll move this page into mainspace.'''
 
'''This is still under construction because this literally just happened. When finished, I'll move this page into mainspace.'''
  
== Summary ==
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__TOC__
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= Summary =
  
 
A combination of a regularly scheduled offsite backup job and some strange behaviour by the studio PCs caused urybackup0 (specifically the music store) to have severely degraded performance. This in turn meant that music uploads to the central library, which normally take less than a minute, would take far longer, sometimes reaching 10 minutes and timing out. One show had to be canceled as a result because the host was not able to get all his music onto the system in time. The incident was not resolved, but mitigated by restarting Samba and the studio PCs.
 
A combination of a regularly scheduled offsite backup job and some strange behaviour by the studio PCs caused urybackup0 (specifically the music store) to have severely degraded performance. This in turn meant that music uploads to the central library, which normally take less than a minute, would take far longer, sometimes reaching 10 minutes and timing out. One show had to be canceled as a result because the host was not able to get all his music onto the system in time. The incident was not resolved, but mitigated by restarting Samba and the studio PCs.
  
== Timeline ==
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=== What Went Well ===
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* Effective collaboration by the incident team, especially considering MP didn't really know what he was doing around backup0
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=== What Did Not Go Well ===
 +
 
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* It took a long time to get the incident declared, by which point it had forced one show to cancel
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* We had limited insight into what was going on with samba/zfs, limited to htop and tcpdumps
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* Took some time to find the people who knew what they were doing
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* Red herrings abound (FFMPEG, RAID issues, hammering, the backup job - any or all of these could have been a red herring)
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=== How We Got Lucky ===
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* After the samba and studioPCs restart, performance brought itself back down to acceptable levels
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= Next Steps =
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* Continue investigating - no real conclusion as to the causes yet
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* We Do Not Patch Shit Without Telling Anyone, and anyone who does that will be slapped around a bit with a trout
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= Timeline =
  
 
(all times GMT)
 
(all times GMT)

Revision as of 15:45, 5 November 2019

Incident Report
We DDoS'd ourselves
Summary
Severity Moderate
Impact Medium (Manual uploaded non-functional, one canceled show as a result - only a few seconds of dead air though)
Event Start 04/11/2019 09:00
Event End 05/11/2019 02:00
Recurrence Mitigation Stop the self-DDoS, restart samba, cry
Contacts
Recovery Leader Marks Polakovs (MP)
Other Attendees Matthew Stratford (MS), Isaac Lowe (IL), Anthony Williams (AW)


URY is FUCKED (Frustratingly, URY Can't Keep Electronics Deferential)

This is still under construction because this literally just happened. When finished, I'll move this page into mainspace.

Summary

A combination of a regularly scheduled offsite backup job and some strange behaviour by the studio PCs caused urybackup0 (specifically the music store) to have severely degraded performance. This in turn meant that music uploads to the central library, which normally take less than a minute, would take far longer, sometimes reaching 10 minutes and timing out. One show had to be canceled as a result because the host was not able to get all his music onto the system in time. The incident was not resolved, but mitigated by restarting Samba and the studio PCs.

What Went Well

  • Effective collaboration by the incident team, especially considering MP didn't really know what he was doing around backup0

What Did Not Go Well

  • It took a long time to get the incident declared, by which point it had forced one show to cancel
  • We had limited insight into what was going on with samba/zfs, limited to htop and tcpdumps
  • Took some time to find the people who knew what they were doing
  • Red herrings abound (FFMPEG, RAID issues, hammering, the backup job - any or all of these could have been a red herring)

How We Got Lucky

  • After the samba and studioPCs restart, performance brought itself back down to acceptable levels

Next Steps

  • Continue investigating - no real conclusion as to the causes yet
  • We Do Not Patch Shit Without Telling Anyone, and anyone who does that will be slapped around a bit with a trout

Timeline

(all times GMT)

9:00 - A regularly scheduled offsite backup job, which should be nightly and incremental... was not either of those things, for reasons unknown to man. It starts copying the entirety of the music store from backup0 to moyles (in IT Services TFTA data-center on East), which starts hammering the ZFS pools on backup0.

20:48 - A member reports in Slack that they are unable to upload music. With just over an hour to go to their show, and 12 songs left to upload, they are forced to cancel.

21:32 - MP alerts #computing in Slack to a serious incident. INCIDENT BEGINS.

21:35 - MS reports that he had done some package updates on dolby(?) over the weekend, including ffmpeg, which may be causing stuck uploads. (This is eventually shown to be a red herring, but is important to include in this report.)

Between these entries, the computing team are sidetracked by an unrelated issue with MyRadio emails

22:30 - MS reports that ffmpeg conversions are working manually.

22:36 - MP adds debug logging to the MyRadio upload controller, showing that it is hanging on a call to move_uploaded_file, a built-in PHP function. This leads him to point the finger to the music store.

22:55 - AW logs on to backup0 to troubleshoot the pools, sees the degraded performance, but notes that zpool reports it is running fine.

22:59 - AW notices the stuck(?) offsite backup job

23:04 - AW notes that the RAID controllers are chugging as well

23:10 - MP and AW decide to restart Samba, but have to wait until midnight as there is a show on air

23:13 - AW notices that a Samba log is generating 100KB/s, and a 5MB log size limit means that it is rotating the log every few seconds. He also notes that the ARC cache is very low and that swap is not enabled. Around this time, a very frustrated MP goes for a run to let off steam.

23:25 - AW notes that the incremental backup job... is not incremental... and has been sending the entire music dataset to moyles for over 12 hours

23:35 - IL logs on and reports that the backup was intentionally not an incremental one (for reasons that the author (MP) does not yet understand). At 23:38 he kills it.

23:41 - MP gets lost in Alcuin.

23:49 - MS and IL report that the Windows 10 photos app is seemingly hammering backup0's shares

00:05 - MP returns and stops samba. Performance on backup0 immediately jumps tenfold. However, MP screws up and doesn't realise that samba also handles his credentials (from the Windows domain).

00:10 - MS logs on with his local account and restarts samba. Performance degrades immediately. MP notes that Xymon does not monitor samba on backup0 at all.

00:14 - AW notes that the picture hammering noted earlier is likely one of the studio PCs.

00:38-00:43 - MP remotes into wogan and restarts all the studio presenter and guest PCs. At 00:56 he reports that performance has not, in fact, improved substantially.

01:06 - MS tests song uploading and notes that, while it is still slow, it has improved dramatically. INCIDENT ENDS

01:26 - MP and the gang head to bed.